TERRA ECONOMICUS, , Vol. 15 (no. 3),

Citizens’ welfare in large part is depending on quantity and quality of the club and merit goods that they consume at their living places. These parameters of the goods in turn are depending on, firstly, the volumes of available resources, and secondly, the municipal staff incentives for qualified and creative work in the sphere of these goods production and/or delivery. These incentives affect particularly the volumes of available resources too, by entering or non-entering in some kind of inter-municipal interactions. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the inter-municipal interactions (IMI) variety from the point of view municipal services delivery efficacy and efficiency. The following types of IMI are discussed: competition, coordination (collaboration), coopetition (competition and collaboration simultaneously), and merger as “marginal” form of IMI. The analyses show that by reason of municipal services heterogeneity, and differences of the links between services delivery costs and municipality size, there are different discrete institutional alternatives providing various services delivery efficacy and efficiency.

Keywords: inter-municipal interactions; competition; cooperation; coopetition; merger

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Publisher: Southern Federal University
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2073-6606