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TERRA ECONOMICUS

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  • 2014
  • No 3
  • Political participation of small business as the strategy of protecting property in Russian regions

Political participation of small business as the strategy of protecting property in Russian regions

TERRA ECONOMICUS, , Vol. 12 (no. 3),
p. 152-161

The article is about the ways entrepreneurs with deputy status use in order to minimize market and nonmarket risks. The research was based on property rights theory and focus on small and middle business in the case of two Russian regions. Author views political participation as the strategy of property rights protection. Other strategies were critically analyzed. High rate of entrepreneurs in regional and municipal parliament is explained by unstable institutional environment and weak state protection of property rights. The main conclusion is that resources and opportunities, connected with deputy status, let entrepreneurs to reduce their vulnerability.


Keywords: property rights; small business; power; regional economics; raiding; protection

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Publisher: Southern Federal University
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2073-6606