Value of political resource in the Russian economy: Past and present

TERRA ECONOMICUS, , Vol. 18 (no. 3),

The study relies on the institutional economic history framework. We focus on the value of exclusive political resource leading to the building of hierarchically organized conglomerate of enclaves of wealth in the Russian economy. Various milestones of Russian history are emphasized. The functioning and evolution of enclaves of wealth are characterized through a complicated interweaving of added value chains and chains of value redistribution. The enclave nature of the Russian economy means that there is sustainable fragmentation of domestic economic markets. Integration of economy and society is ensured by the centralized market of power. Historically caused process of the building and functioning of enclaves of wealth in the modern Russian economy is the subject of special analysis. Their types are highlighted, and their impact on the development of the rest of the economy is characterized. The modern Russian economy is based on the export-resource enclaves of wealth. Industrial enclaves of wealth, which have been built in a number of Russian regions (for instance, Kaluga region), are the «inner maquiladoras» serving high-margin markets in the megalopolises and large cities. Innovation and scientific-educational enclaves of wealth have emerged as the result of projects of innovation development of the Russian economy and the transformation of the scientific-educational sector. These are positioned as the most important directions for building the innovation economy in Russia. However, the authors suggest that they are «pure recipients» receiving economic resources from the rest of the economy.
Citation: Levin, S. N., Sablin, K. S. (2020). Value of political resource in the Russian economy: Past and present. Terra Economicus, 18(3), 72–86. DOI: 10.18522/2073-66062020-18-3-72-86
Acknowledgment: The article is supported by the Grant of RFBR № 19-010-00244.

Keywords: political resource; enclaves of wealth; political-administrative market; added value chains; chains of value redistribution

JEL codes: O43

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Publisher: Southern Federal University
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2073-6606