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TERRA ECONOMICUS

MATHEMATICAL MODELLING FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

TERRA ECONOMICUS, , Vol. 17 (no. 3),

Institutional design is a targeted change to the system of socio-economic institutions. This concept is widely used in English-language literature, also sometimes in Russian-language publications. In economics, institutional design processes include the establishment of rules for the use of public resources, the implementation of economic reforms, the creation and reform of economic organizations that significantly affect relations between groups of economic agents, etc. From the many publications in which the processes of institutional design are discussed, the author, using databases such as google scholar, elibrary.ru and search sites, selected for analysis those where the application of mathematical models and calculations takes place. Some of them do not contain the term “institutional design”, but contain its synonyms or describe particular cases of its application. This article suggests the classification of mathematical models used in these publications. Among them are econometric models, models of general economic equilibrium, econophysical models involving the application in economics of the methods of the theory of nonlinear dynamic systems, models of game theory (in particular, evolutionary game theory and game theory related to the collective use of resources), and imitation models. Examples of publications about specific types of models are given. The strengths and weaknesses of the use of various types of models and mathematical methods are indicated and the prospects for their use are discussed. Particular attention is paid to the use of information technology in institutional design, which is actively developing due to the presence of the Internet and large computing power, as well as the development and adoption of blockchain technology by society
Citation: Kirilyuk, I. L. (2019). Mathematical modelling for institutional design. Terra Economicus, 17(3), 64–77. DOI: 10.23683/2073-6606-2019-17-3-64-77


Keywords: institutional design; institutional economy; mesoeconomics; economic-mathematical modeling; game theory; effective altruism; econophysics; evolutionary economics

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Publisher: Southern Federal University
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2073-6606