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  • Is it possible to synthesize various institutional approaches to the analysis of property?

Is it possible to synthesize various institutional approaches to the analysis of property?

TERRA ECONOMICUS, , Vol. 12 (no. 2),
p. 22-33

Manifold approaches to the analysis of the institution of property are considered in the article. We, in particular, stress the deliberative nature of the process of various schools interaction in the framework of modern institutional economic theory. The theoretical concepts of Old Institutionalism and New Institutional Economics applied to the institution of property have been analyzed. We have likewise exposed the primary theoretical instruments of the analysis. The major contemporary problems concerned with the institution of property are posed in the article.

Keywords: institutional economics; property; the institution of property; old institutional economic theory; neo-institutionalism; government economic policy

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Publisher: Southern Federal University
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2073-6606