TERRA ECONOMICUS, , Vol. 16 (no. 3),

A large corporation with a system of specific objective attributes is the most enigmatic subject of the modern market economy: being a fictitious legal entity, it performs its economic activities; being an extreme form of a free self-realization of the market organization of the economy, it becomes an anti-market entity with the process of the monopolization of the production; being coerced to collaborate with all other market participants, it is feuding with almost every one of them. The author considers this market-anti-market status of a large corporation as the source of its immanent self-movement. In this situation, the main subject of the progressive development of the market system becomes the corporate sector, the market position of which have an influence on the future of the market civilization. The article deals with a theoretical analysis of the contribution which can be made by the domestic corporate sector to the systemic progression of the Russian market. After defining the problem, the author proceeds with the following aspects: the dual position of the corporation between the government and the market; an off-market source of the economic power of the corporation; the degree of a real threat to the Russian market of monopolistic «imperialism» from the part of Russian corporations. The author puts a question, what is more effective for the society from the historical perspective – the nationalization of the national economy or its corporatization? The conclusion is, that when entering a stable trajectory of market development, Russian corporations, which concentrate their huge industrial and financial capital in their sector, cannot stand aside. On the contrary, it is necessary that they promote the widespread introduction of market principles, rather than the revival of the principles of the former administrative management system. Therefore, in the opinion of the author, a special economic policy should be formed, the tools and methodology of which would maximize market and minimize the anti-market encroachments of each group of Russian corporations.

Keywords: corporation; economic potential of a corporation; role of corporations in Russian market economy

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Publisher: Southern Federal University
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2073-6606