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Риск-менеджмент в современном банковском бизнесе

TERRA ECONOMICUS, , Том 13 (номер 3),

В силу специфики бизнеса кредитных институтов они являются носителями риска, зачастую системного, о чем свидетельствуют банковские кризисы, и особенно последний глобальный финансово-экономический кризис, который обнажил слабые места как в регулировании банковской деятельности и надзоре за ней, так и в качестве управления в коммерческих банках. Трансформация рисков и управление рисками относятся к ключевым функциям менеджмента в банках. Чем точнее оценка риска и выбор решения о способах реагирования на них при различных сценариях и вероятности реализации риска, тем эффективнее управление в банке и меньше вероятность его несостоятельности. Традиционно подходы к анализу поведения банковской компании базируются на принципах финансового менеджмента (управления портфелем активов). В отличие от промышленной или торговой организации, банк представляет собой более закрытую, более сложную и менее прозрачную структуру. Анализируя особенности внутренней финансовой структуры кредитных организаций, можно выделить тенденцию к изменению характера банка как экономического агента. Если до начала 2000-х годов банки рассматривались как нейтральные к риску участники рынка, то позже возобладала трактовка банков как негативно относящихся к риску агентов. Этот подход упрочился после глобального финансового кризиса 2008–2010 года. В век информационных технологий построение систем риск-менеджмента в финансовых институтах неразрывно связано с развертыванием и поддержанием на высоком уровне ИТ-инфраструктуры. Индикатором эффективности риск-менеджмента и высокой риск-культуры в банках является рост числа программных средств, позволяющих автоматизировать процессы и процедуры риск-менеджмента и таким образом выстраивать систему по адекватному и эффективному реагированию на риски. Организация ИТ-архитектуры в банке оценивается как элемент риск-культуры и риск-менеджмента в современном банковском бизнесе, как ключевой фактор конкурентоспособности финансовой организации и возможный важный показатель состояния дел для регулирующих органов.


Ключевые слова: риск-менеджмент; риск-культура; банковский бизнес; информационные технологии

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Издатель: Южный Федеральный Университет
Учредитель: Южный федеральный университет
ISSN: 2073-6606